What is Türkiye's pathway to limit global warming to 1.5°C?
Current Situation
Emissions
Türkiye emitted 552 MtCO2e (excluding LULUCF) in 2023.1, 2 The energy sector is responsible for almost three-quarters of these emissions, due to growing energy demand which has historically been met by fossil fuels. Türkiye has embarked on a significant renewables rollout, though the rollout continues to be outpaced by growing demand. Imported coal and gas meets the remaining demand growth.3
As a result of its significant energy sector, 80% of Turkish emissions are CO2 (excl. LULUCF). However, methane accounts for 12% of Turkish emissions from of agriculture, waste, and coal mining.4
Türkiye’s industry sector is responsible for 26% of its overall emissions. The cement industry in particular is responsible for a large share of industry emissions, with limestone calcination and huge quantities of coal use leading to an outsized climate impact.5 To stimulate emissions reductions in its industry sector, Türkiye has formalised an emissions trading system, with the pilot phase to be launched in 2026.6
Türkiye’s LULUCF sector is a net sink, removing 69 MtCO2e in 2023. This represents a bounce back to pre-2021 levels, when massive wildfires ripped through Türkiye’s forests, releasing significant emissions and impacting the sector’s absorption capacity. Severe wildfires also occurred in 2024 and 2025, though they did not affect the carbon sink to the extent of the 2021 fires.7, 8
Türkiye's 2023 GHG emissions
excluding LULUCF MtCO₂e/yr
When graphs include LULUCF, the center value includes LULUCF if the sector is a net source of emissions and excludes it when the sector is a net sink of emissions. Individual sector rounding may lead to small inconsistencies in total sum.
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Graph description
Historical emissions per gas and per sector. Emissions data is presented in global warming potential (GWP) values from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).
Data References
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Energy
Türkiye’s energy mix remains dependent on fossil fuels, which made up 82% of the overall energy supply in 2023. This split is relatively equally distributed between oil, gas and coal.
Overreliance on fossil fuel imports has exposed Türkiye to volatile fossil fuel markets. As Türkiye imports 90% of its oil and 96% of its gas, any USD 10 dollar increase to oil adds USD 4.5-5 bn to the public deficit. The 2026 war in Iran alone has added around USD 15 billion to the public deficit.9 This vulnerability has stimulated a turn to domestic energy resources to improve energy security and reduce Türkiye’s significant fossil fuel import bill – which amounted to USD 66 bn in 2024.10, 11 Nevertheless, this pivot to renewables is already producing dividends, with installed wind and solar capacity reducing the 2024 fossil import bill by USD 12 bn.12
Rising wind and solar has already displaced significant volumes of gas from electricity supply, with the share of gas falling from a 2014 peak of 48% to 21% in 2023. However, recent analysis from Ember indicates that drought-related declines in hydropower output has led to an uptick in gas imports, with the share of gas slightly rising to 22% in 2025.13
Despite progress in expanding wind and solar capacity, the Turkish government continues to finance fossil fuels. It is the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe and is pouring money into oil and gas drilling.14, 15 Such support for the fossil fuel industry runs counter to Paris Agreement principles and recent developments in international law.16
Renewables and electrification of end-use sectors present a strategic opportunity to reduce dependency on energy imports and global price volatilities, enhancing the country’s energy security. Financing fossil fuels, however, maintains the risk of stranded assets as renewables costs continue to fall.